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Abstract
This chapter is about the ethical implications of health sector actions intended to change individuals' or
communities' weight. We consider these implications using two hypothetical cases. The first is Megan, a
15-year-old girl whose BMI is in the range defined as obese. She has been unable to lose weight and her
parents are considering seeking clinical help. The second case is the population of the state where
Megan lives, in which 35% of adults and 15% of children are reportedly overweight, and 17% of adults and
5% of children obese. The minister for health, prompted by these statistics, is determined to take action.
What ethical issues are relevant for Megan, her parents, and the health professionals they may consult?
What ethical issues are relevant for the citizens of the state, their minister for health and their
bureaucrats? How does a focus on the care of individuals impact on public health, and how might
community-level interventions affect people like Megan? Interventions designed to treat and prevent
obesity in individuals and in communities raise important ethical issues. These issues are both distinct
and overlapping; because the interventions have different goals, risks and benefits, moral compromise is
always necessary. The central task is to think through the ethical and philosophical issues before action
is taken: whether in clinical medicine or in public health. We present ethical approaches that can assist in
such reasoning.
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The ethical implications of intervening in bodyweight
Stacy M Carter,1,2 Ian Kerridge,1 Lucie Rychetnik1,2 and Lesley King3

This chapter is about the ethical implications of health sector actions intended to change
individuals’ or communities’ weight. We consider these implications using two hypothetical
cases. The first is Megan, a 15-year-old girl whose BMI is in the range defined as obese. She
has been unable to lose weight and her parents are considering seeking clinical help. The
second case is the population of the state where Megan lives, in which 35% of adults and
15% of children are reportedly overweight, and 17% of adults and 5% of children obese. The
minister for health, prompted by these statistics, is determined to take action. What ethical
issues are relevant for Megan, her parents, and the health professionals they may consult?
What ethical issues are relevant for the citizens of the state, their minister for health and
their bureaucrats? How does a focus on the care of individuals impact on public health,
and how might community-level interventions affect people like Megan? Interventions
designed to treat and prevent obesity in individuals and in communities raise important
ethical issues. These issues are both distinct and overlapping; because the interventions
have different goals, risks and benefits, moral compromise is always necessary. The central
task is to think through the ethical and philosophical issues before action is taken: whether
in clinical medicine or in public health. We present ethical approaches that can assist in
such reasoning.

In this chapter we examine the ethical implications of intervening in weight, and the ethical
difference between intervening in the weight of individuals and the weight of populations.
We discuss these issues via two cases: Megan, a hypothetical 15-year-old girl, and Australia,
the country where Megan lives. We conclude that there are distinct and overlapping ethical
concerns at individual and population levels, and that at both levels moral compromise
is necessary. Both clinicians and public health professionals need to consider the ethical
issues and implications before action is taken. Using our two cases, this chapter provides
examples of such reasoning.

1 Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney.
2 Sydney School of Public Health, University of Sydney.
3 Prevention Research Collaboration, Sydney School of Public Health, University of Sydney.
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Megan

Megan is 15 and a high-school student. She is technically ‘overweight’: 165 cm tall and 76
kg, with a body mass index of 27.9 kg/m2. Megan has always been larger than many of her
peers. As a young child Megan wasn’t aware of her weight, but began to be self-conscious
in primary school after being teased by a fellow student for being fat. Since then she has
become increasingly fearful of bullying. Megan has two close friends, but other students
often tease her during breaks at school. In physical education classes she is often overlooked
in team selections and teased by fellow pupils.
Megan’s parents became worried about her weight when she was six. They enrolled Megan
in several team sports over the years, but she begged to be allowed to discontinue each
one: she felt uncoordinated and awkward and was resented by teammates, who saw her
as a liability. When she was ten, her parents began putting her on diets. In the last four
years she has tried a meal replacement product, Weight Watchers, a grapefruit diet and
the Atkins diet: each time Megan lost weight but regained it. Friends, family members,
teachers, or even complete strangers frequently comment about Megan’s weight. When
this happens, she thinks: ‘Don’t they realise? I already know I’m fat and I’m trying to fix
it!’ Megan’s parents worry about her future; they hear constant media reports about health
risks, depression and other problems associated with higher weights.
Someone suggests Dr Jim Spright – a general practitioner experienced in managing
overweight in adolescence – as a good starting point to ‘do something’ about Megan’s
weight, and Megan’s parents decide to seek his professional advice.
The population in which Megan lives

Megan lives in a metropolitan city in Australia, where approximately 21% of adults are
considered obese and 35% overweight, and 25% of children aged five to 17 overweight
or obese [1]. The hypothetical health minister, prompted by these statistics, public health
officials and academics, decides that she wants a formal overweight and obesity strategy. An
Obesity Summit is convened to discuss policy options. Academics, public servants, public
health officials, commercial weight-loss service providers, exercise industry representatives,
food industry manufacturing and retail representatives, surgeons, endocrinologists and
general practitioners – including Dr Spright – are all invited.
Over the course of the summit, participants discuss many options. How should food be
labelled and marketed? Should marketing for some foods be banned? Should healthy
behaviours be mandated? Should health department money be spent on projects with
departments of public transport and urban planning? Should spending be focused on kids
or on adults? What should be done in schools? Should bariatric surgery be publicly funded,
how and for whom? How should social marketing be used, and what can it achieve? Their
goal is to produce feasible, acceptable recommendations for actions that will reduce the
population prevalence of overweight and obesity significantly by 2020.
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Individuals and populations as a focus for action

A distinction between intervening in the lives of individuals – like Megan – and intervening
in populations – like Australia – is fundamental to public health practice. An iconic
statement of this was made by Geoffrey Rose in his 1985 paper ‘Sick individuals and sick
populations’ [2]. Rose noted that within our population, we tend to treat average states as
‘normal’, and deviation from such states as ‘abnormal’ [2]. We present to doctors as patients
because we perceive ourselves to be ‘abnormal.’ The goal of clinicians is to determine whether
we are ‘abnormal’, and if so, explain why. Rose argued that this is an investigation of why
variation occurs within a population [2]; in the case of weight, for example, a doctor tries to
determine why a patient is fatter than the rest of the population. This is done through direct
clinical interaction – a relatively intimate and proximal exchange. The clinician’s problemsolving is based on examination of the patient and listening to the patient’s story, and can
take into account many aspects of their lives. The clinician attempts to determine causes
for that individual, and achieve the best outcome for them. This might require advocacy for
that person against systems designed to ration services.
Rose argued that this important clinical process provides only partial understanding of
health problems. If a causal factor is distributed evenly throughout a population, everyone
in that population is equally exposed to it. Thus a clinician is unlikely to ‘see’ it as a causal
factor for a patient like Megan, because, within the doctor’s population of patients, it
does not explain why some patients are thin and others fat. The only way we can ‘see’ the
effect of such an omnipresent factor is to compare a whole population that is heavier on
average – say Australia – with one that is leaner on average – say Japan [3]. To make such
a comparison changes the key question from ‘Why do some Australian individuals weigh
more than their peers?’ to ‘Why is overweight more common in Australia and less common
in Japan?’ These two explanations, Rose argued, may rest on different causal factors [2].
This led Rose to distinguish between two kinds of intervention: the ‘high-risk’ strategy, in
which individual cases in the high-risk ‘tail’ of a distribution were identified and treated,
and the ‘population strategy’ where root causes were identified and altered to potentially
shift the entire distribution slightly towards lower risk [2]. Although Rose noted strengths
and weaknesses of each, he proposed that the ‘population strategy’ could lead to a greater
average improvement in health because of its radical intervention in root causes for whole
populations.
Clinicians must act in the best interests of a patient, within a health system inevitably
constrained by resource limitations. In contrast, population health interventions focus on
whole populations, and public health policy-makers on allocating resources to maximise
efficiency; this means such policy-makers may need to be less sensitive to the complexities
of individuals’ lives, and more conscious of equity and opportunity cost across whole
populations. In the clinical case, the patient presents to the clinician and asks for treatment.
In the case of public health, the population is unlikely to have asked to have its ‘incidence’
reduced, making the rights and responsibilities of all involved less clear.
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Clinical ethics and public health ethics

Ethics is the study of what should be done: a prescriptive, systematic analysis of what
is required for human wellbeing [4]. The descriptions above reveal the potential for
incompatibility between the ethics of clinical medicine and the ethics of public health.
They occur in a different milieu, take different objects, seek different objectives, and work
from different information. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the development of clinical
ethics has been reasonably distinct from the development of public health ethics.
Ethics has been a concern of the medical profession for over two millennia: in this sense,
medical ethics is not new. However the focus on ethical analysis and reform of clinical
medicine and biotechnology has intensified since the development of bioethics in the 1960s
[5]. Clinical ethics grew and developed during the second half of the 20th century but
during this period public health ethics was relatively neglected [6–8]. Systematic attempts
to establish an ethic for public health began in earnest in the 21st century producing, for
example, a specialist journal [9], full-length books [10] and technical reports [11, 12].
Approaches to clinical ethics

A number of moral frameworks have been proposed to guide clinical decision-making,
including casuistry (case-based reasoning), narrative ethics and the ethics of care [4]. The
most dominant framework, however, has been principle-based ethics (sometimes referred
to as ‘principlism’ [12]. Much-criticised, much-revised and extremely influential, it focuses
on four central and two derived principles for ethical conduct (hence the name): respect
for the autonomy of the patient, beneficence (doing good for the patient), non-maleficence
(not doing harm to the patient), ensuring justice, veracity (practicing honestly) and respect
for the patient’s privacy and confidentiality. While each of these principles is important,
they are, in themselves, not action-guiding and must always be specified and balanced
and supported by rules that describe their scope, authority and relevant processes. Respect
for autonomy, therefore, requires that a patient’s consent is sought before commencing
treatment, but does not demand that a patient’s decisions always be respected, irrespective
of the cost. Likewise, rules for consent must be clearly articulated to outline who can
consent, what capacities are required before one can consent, and what should be done
where a person is unable, because of illness, to consent. While this approach is deceptively
simple, and may obscure considered ethical critique, the fact that it provides a moral
framework that appears consistent with clinical practice has led to its widespread adoption
by the health professions.
Approaches to public health ethics

In contrast to clinical ethics, there is little consensus on the best approach to ethics in public
health, except for a general agreement that public health ethics requires its own framework
[7, 13]. To date the literature has suggested five key issues in evaluating public health
actions: benefits and harms of intervention (or non-intervention), problem definition and
telos (ultimate purpose), fairness and distributive justice, process and procedural justice,
and rights [5, 11, 14–20].
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Maximising benefit, minimising harm

The framework most commonly associated with public health is utilitarianism, a
consequentialist and welfarist philosophical position that emphasises achieving the
greatest good for the greatest number of people. Utilitarians are firstly concerned with the
effectiveness or benefit of an intervention [5, 14, 17, 19, 21] and the balance of any benefits
to the attendant burdens [5, 14]. Possible concerns here include coercion, infringement,
intrusion or undermining of human rights (see below) [11, 14, 16, 17] whether the response
is proportional to the problem [14], whether the action is necessary [14, 19], and the cost
of the intervention, including the opportunity cost [17, 19]. It is also important here to
consider the quality of evidence on matters of ethical concern [15, 19, 20].
Problem definition and telos

Some writers emphasise the severity of the problem or risk addressed [17] and the goals
of intervention as key issues for ethical evaluation. More ethical interventions are thought
to relate to severe problems, fundamental causes, conditions and environments, and/or to
address the ill-health that people impose on each other rather than the ill-health people
impose upon themselves, because this is more respectful of the autonomy of individuals
[5, 15].
Increasing fairness or distributive justice

Other writers have argued that social justice, community, common good and/or recognition
of mutual vulnerability are the best basis for public health ethics [6, 22, 23]. These writers
suggest that it is most important to evaluate the fairness of goals and interventions, and
the distribution of benefits and burdens, especially with regard to vulnerable groups and
health inequalities [5, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21]. For these writers, goods in public health may
be more valuable if they can be obtained only, or more efficiently, through collective action
or if benefits pertain to whole communities [5, 14, 17, 19, 21], such as through provision of
supportive environments or assisting communities to act [11, 16].
Process and procedural justice

Another approach is less concerned with principles, values or justifications, and more with
processes and procedural justice. This approach values collaboration and participation
[14, 15], transparency and accountability (including informing or disclosing, speaking
truthfully, and providing public justification) [14–16, 19, 20] acknowledging and
accommodating diversity, applying fair process when consensus cannot be reached [14,
15], obtaining consent, determining community acceptance or ensuring adequate mandate
for intervention [11, 15, 19], and building and maintaining trust [14, 15].
Rights as a basis for public health

The final domain argues – broadly – that human rights provide the most coherent,
egalitarian, universalisable and critical framework for public health [7, 17]. These rights
generally include protection of privacy and confidentiality [15] and respecting the ‘right to
health’ enshrined in some international agreements, which entails a ‘positive right’ to health
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improvement [7, 17, 24]. Limiting an individual’s freedoms is justified only to prevent harm
to others, that is, respecting their ‘negative right’ to non-interference – sometimes called
the Millian harm principle, after John Stuart Mill [7, 16, 21, 24].
A central problem for all approaches to public health ethics

Consideration of each of these domains is necessary for a comprehensive account of any
public health intervention. All approaches, arguably, can inform decisions regarding a key
problem in public health ethics: the degree to which coercion – forcing someone to act
against their own will – or paternalism – interfering with someone’s liberty or autonomy
without their consent to make them better off – are ethically permissible in public health
[25, 26]. This is a central issue because degrees of coercion and paternalism have been
key to the successes of public health [7, 11, 21] – think of seatbelt laws, gun control,
fluoridation, sanitation and food hygiene regulations. A central challenge for public health
is thus to define exactly when paternalism and/or coercion are permissible, and under what
conditions, and what responsibilities this may entail for governments and individuals [18].
Some public health actions are justified by qualifying the paternalism involved. Three
justificatory qualifications are made. The first is that the paternalism is ‘soft’ – that is, that
it restricts only ill-informed and involuntarily actions. The second is that the paternalism
is ‘weak’ – that is, that it interferes only when a person’s actions are inconsistent with their
own goals. The final justification is that the paternalism is ‘welfare oriented’ – that is, that
those intervening are concerned only for a person’s physical and psychological condition, as
opposed to preventing them from being ‘morally corrupted’ [11, 18, 21]. These distinctions
are a matter of degree and need to be argued on a case-by-case basis.
Some, particularly those concerned with rights and with procedural justice, argue that a
simplistic opposition – paternalism or coercion versus freedom – obscures the complex
relationship between these concepts, and de-emphasises the positive freedoms that public
health interventions can promote [21]. Although voluntarism is not always effective [6],
freedoms can decrease the need for coercion. If states engage communities, earning trust
that negative freedoms will be respected, individuals may be more likely to seek help;
conversely coercive interventions may be less effective or drive epidemics underground [7,
14, 17]. In addition, even strongly paternalistic actions could be moderated by democratic
oversight or a community-level mandate [27]. These scholars would argue that by engaging
communities paternalism can be lessened and better justified.
We have now considered both clinical and public health ethics. In clinical ethics, a clinician
engages directly with a patient and the problem she presents. The clinician attempts to act
in the patient’s best interests and to advocate on her behalf. The clinician seeks to determine
what has made that individual patient atypical – ‘high risk’ – in the distribution of her peers.
More ethical clinical conduct, broadly speaking, will be that which respects the patients’
autonomy, does her good, does not harm her, treats her justly and honestly, and respects
her privacy and confidentiality. In public health, the situation is different. A decisionmaker engages with ‘problems’ that are most likely to be defined statistically by the state,
and may not be priorities for the community. The public health professional – if applying
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a ‘population’ strategy – will seek to determine what makes this population different from
other populations in regard to that problem, and to intervene in these ‘root causes’, ideally
in a way that maximises benefit, minimises harm, seeks justice, is procedurally transparent,
minimises violation of the rights of individuals, and can justify any coercion or paternalism
entailed.
What ethical issues are relevant for Megan, her parents and Dr Spright?

Megan and her parents attend Dr Spright’s office for a long appointment. Spright’s
training, as Rose would say [2], is to find the ‘causes of Megan’s case’, that is to find a causal
explanation for why Megan, as an individual, deviates from the average or desired weight
for her age. During the appointment he asks many questions about Megan – about her
development, diet, exercise, other illnesses, symptoms, schooling, friends and family.
He takes measurements and samples. He discusses the evidence for, and his experience
with, a variety of approaches and services – dietary regimes, weight-loss clubs, specialist
physicians and centres and exercise programs.
Dr Spright – Jim – has done continuing education courses in clinical ethics. He is keenly
aware that his interactions with Megan and her mother are ethically charged, and that
bioethical principles are expressed daily through the actions of doctors like him. Jim tries
to conduct himself ethically, as he would with any other patient. In the interests of nonmaleficence, he recommends actively against some programs and services that he thinks
are non-evidence based and exploitive. His beneficence is expressed through offering
evidence-based options that he thinks will help. He tries to respect the autonomy of both
Megan and her parents in their conversation. Jim knows that Megan has her own opinions
and goals and tries to draw her out whenever he can. He tries to inform but not overinform, pulling back when they seem to be overwhelmed. He offers his own opinion – with
clear reasons – when Megan and her mother ask for it. He is careful not to act in ways
that could undermine Megan’s self-esteem, and he gently asks questions about the role
of her family in her daily habits, not assuming that she is completely independent in her
choices [28]. Apart from being sensitive to whether or not Megan’s family can afford private
services, and whether they are insured, Jim doesn’t consider the cost of different treatments
when making his recommendations – he considers only whether or not he thinks they are
best for Megan.
In this sense, Megan is like any one of Jim’s patients. However Megan is also unlike many
of Jim’s patients. Megan is apparently well. If she suffers from any current condition, it is
the psychological effects of the stigma commonly experienced by fat people [29]. Jim is not
being asked to treat a current, urgent medical condition like a broken finger or an acute
infection. Instead he is being asked to ‘treat’ two problems: a future risk (that Megan will
experience future weight-related health problems), and a socially produced psychological
condition (the product of her stigmatisation). Jim does not think about Megan in this way,
however. Because of his expertise and training, because he has read many reports showing
that obesity is potentially damaging for health, and because Megan and her mother are
asking him for assistance he defines Megan’s weight as ‘a problem’. He sets about explaining
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why she is fatter than other 15-year-olds, and seeks to provide an individually tailored
solution in the most ethical way possible. This individualism is a natural product of case
analysis, attention to ethical principles and clinical problem-solving. It is, however, very
different from what happens at the Obesity Summit.
What ethical issues are relevant for Australian citizens, their minister for health and their
bureaucrats?

The week after Jim sees Megan, he attends the Obesity Summit. Before he goes he reads some
of the preparatory material, but it doesn’t seem clear to him which strategies are evidence
based and which are not. A lot of evidence is presented for the prevalence of overweight
and obesity, but not much about the effectiveness or implementation of programs. Megan
is on his mind as he travels to the meeting in Canberra. What good will this do her, he
wonders? In fact, what difference will this make for anyone?
There are several hundred people at the summit. Jim notices that not many of the
participants seem to be obese themselves. After the Welcome to Country ceremony the
health minister is introduced. She stands amid the applause, walks to the microphone and
begins her opening speech.
We face a crisis in this country. Two-thirds of Australian men are overweight. Half of
Australian women are overweight. A quarter of our children are overweight. Many of us are
dying of the diseases that are complications of obesity, such as diabetes and cardiovascular
disease.
The question is what we do about it. Answering that question is what we are here for.
Australians are simply eating more kilojoules than they are burning. Everyday foods that
have become part of our daily diet are laden with kilojoules. Most ordinary snacks – icecreams, chocolate bars, soft drinks – would require an hour of fast walking to burn off. We
are adding these snacks to our diets and simultaneously doing less and less exercise.
Somehow, we have to find a way to eat less and move around more. We need to lose some
weight. I don’t think the answer is banning things. We don’t want to shut down industries, or
gag their right to advertise. We don’t want to tell people that they can’t have treats, that they
can’t celebrate with their families. We need to find ways to make people feel responsible for
their own actions. We need to encourage industries to self-regulate. We need to encourage
people to make better choices. We need to give people better information.
Your job is to work out how best we can do that. It’s the most important health challenge
facing this country today. I will look forward to receiving the recommendations from the
meeting. Thank you for agreeing to be a part of it.

Over the next few days, health bureaucrats, consumer advocates, representatives of
industry, and experts from public health, epidemiology, nutrition, health economics,
exercise physiology, health education and law rise to the minister’s challenge – presenting
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sometimes conflicting data regarding the costs to the community, and to individuals, of the
‘obesity epidemic’ and calling for support for a range of interventions to meet it.
The summit concludes with a resolution calling upon the federal and state governments to
prioritise two strategies: 1) a large, persuasive social marketing campaign aimed at raising
awareness of the problem and motivating individuals to do something about their diet
and sedentary behaviours; and 2) greater funding for obesity-related medical consultations
and for bariatric surgery, including for adolescents. These recommendations are broadly
acceptable to most political interests at the summit. They give something to both public
health professionals and clinicians. They locate the problem and its solution with individual
citizens; they permit egalitarian rhetoric via statistics showing equal ‘reach’ and ‘access’;
they appear to be minimally restrictive on people’s freedoms; and they provide new income
streams for some interests while not limiting the income streams of commercial interests.
And, perhaps most persuasively, they are framed as being ‘evidence based’ – although in
reality they are no more or less evidence based than other possibilities considered at the
summit.
In many ways the Obesity Summit is a success. It stimulates passing media interest in
obesity, it brings together a range of disciplinary and sectional interests into open dialogue
about obesity, and it generates clear recommendations for action. But closer examination of
the summit reveals many of the assumptions that underpin policy-making around obesity,
the limitations of this model of analysis and decision-making, and the potential value of a
framework for explicit consideration of issues of ethics and evidence in public health.
The minister’s opening speech is familiar to anyone who has been audience to such
occasions. It begins – as such speeches often do – by conflating overweight and obesity,
associating overweight or obesity with death, and suggesting a need for weight loss, or at
least behaviour change. Although the rhetorical power of this is clear, the evidence suggests
that it is somewhat misleading. Many systematic reviews distinguish between the health
effects of obesity versus overweight (showing overweight to be significantly less risky or
even, at some ages, and in some situations, protective) and there are contradictory findings
about the benefits of weight loss [eg 30–34]. The speech also frames individual actions
as the key problem to be solved, and implicitly advocates a purpose for intervention:
encouraging individuals to change their actions. Indeed, the minister explicitly guards the
audience against restriction of trade and commerce, makes no mention of environmental
contributors to obesity and (implicitly) restricts the critique of government. It is easy to
argue that this fails to address the fundamental root causes, conditions and environments
that might stimulate such behaviours, ignores the ill-health that people impose on each
other, and in fact focuses on preventing people from harming themselves.
The speech also emphasises that obesity is harmful and suggests that public health action
will be beneficial. Throughout the summit, experts present competing accounts of the
benefits and harms of various interventions, and many of the small group discussions
focus on these evaluations. Such evaluative practices are fundamental in both public health
planning and utilitarianism. Inasmuch as there is a positive right to health improvement,
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or responsibility for public health practitioners to improve health, then advocacy for action
– including advocacy of its benefits – is reasonable and required. Yet while there is much
optimistic talk of benefits, there is often very little focus on potential harms. Jim might well
think about Megan – an overweight but not obese adolescent coping with teasing, anxiety
and reduced self-esteem – and wonder how some of the interventions proposed at the
summit might affect her. Interventions such as the withdrawn Singaporean school-based
program Trim and Fit have been empirically associated with negative outcomes such as
bullying and eating disorders for young people [35], often while producing the desired
reductions in weight. This demonstrates the importance of going beyond ‘effectiveness’ –
for example, measures of desired behaviour change – by employing ethical reasoning. It
also suggests the need for better measurement of potential harms, including stigmatisation
[20].
Public health decisions should rely on evaluations of harm and benefit [5, 11, 14, 16, 17,
19]. But the utilitarian ideal of balancing all relevant benefits and harms based on evidence
is unlikely to be achieved [36]. Evidence is consumed in the context of political, social,
media and lobbying pressures. Our hypothetical Obesity Summit is a conglomeration
of interest groups jostling for prime position, and threatening harms such as job losses,
restrictions on commercial freedom of speech, or damage to economic productivity. Little
wonder then that public health professionals, with the best intentions, feel a responsibility
to provide the most compelling evidence they can about the health benefits of interventions!
Even the purest utilitarian decision-making requires weighing up of non-equivalent, and
perhaps non-comparable, benefits and harms. Simple utilitarianism can also be limited
by inattention to egalitarian ideals. Fairness is rarely measured [23] or addressed in
mainstream public health strategies [eg 37], despite its rhetorical prominence in public
health documents [38]. Although recent commentaries have asserted Rose’s deep concern
for egalitarianism [39], the idea of shifting an entire population towards slightly lower risk
is sometimes used to justify prioritising utilitarian average benefit over greater fairness in
distribution of benefit. This is a values-based rather than an empirically based commitment
[6, 22, 23]. Regarding weight, empirical evidence suggests that – for example – higher
weight is associated with lower educational achievement [40], that the poorest Australian
neighbourhoods have 2.5 times as many fast-food outlets as the richest neighbourhoods
[41], and that the objective weight and subjective perception of the acceptability of weight
in adolescents varies according to their socioeconomic status [42]. Thus, fair distribution
may be at least as ethically important as average benefit.
And what of rights, freedoms, coercion and paternalism? Although many scholars interested
in these areas have focused on pandemic contagious disease [16, 43], the issues are also
critical in chronic states such as overweight, for which the threat of harm is less immediate
and less certain. Tobacco and alcohol provide examples of risk factors for which an argument
can perhaps be made that behaviour constitutes a threat to others (environmental tobacco
smoke and violence, respectively). At the Obesity Summit, economists attempt to provide
arguments about such other-regarding harms, including costs to the taxpayer, caring
burdens on families and work absenteeism. But while each of these issues seem relevant, for
the most part they fail to gain traction in discussions regarding how the government should
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intervene in response to obesity, in part, because these are; a) non-health costs; b) based on
highly abstracted models; and c) vulnerable to the way in which overweight versus obese
individuals are classified. Any empirical uncertainties regarding differential risks between
these groups become highly ethically relevant to these debates, raising questions about the
basis for justification of intervention.
One group of scholars has answered this question with procedural justice. If, they argue,
decision-makers make themselves accountable to communities, or can demonstrate a
community mandate for action, they are justified in acting. Models for such mandates
can range from the most broad (eg democratic election of a government) to the most
specific (eg deliberative processes that actively inform and engage a representative
sample of citizens and seek consensus on a course of action for a specific problem such
as overweight). Summits – like our hypothetical one – can help to meet the more limited
requirements of transparency in decision-making. However, they also raise questions about
the circumstances under which mandate can be said to have been achieved. If summits are
populated entirely by ‘experts’ – even if that includes ‘expert’ consumer advocates – can
they be said to provide a real mandate? Who should legitimately make decisions about
public health priorities? [44] Is it realistic to expect ordinary citizens to engage in public
health decision-making? Could such engagement be achieved under the right conditions?
These questions are yet to be answered; they bring us to the relationship between individual
and community-level intervention.
Individual and community-level intervention: thinking across boundaries

Jim Spright feels strangely unsatisfied with the whole process. It felt to him like a ‘political
exercise’, and he is not convinced by the outcome. He thinks about what these strategies
might do for Megan, and for Australia. The campaign may increase the stigma that
Megan experiences at school. Greater funding for surgery and consultations may increase
healthcare costs, expectations of services and distribution of services across the population.
Spright is conservative with referrals for surgery, as he’s concerned about potential, as yet
unknown, future harms of the procedure. He’s also concerned that the increased healthcare
costs may have only a marginal impact on the weight or health of the population. In fact,
he muses, the campaign might inspire Megan to assent to more radical interventions, like
surgery, whether or not that is in her best interests. He also thinks about his poorer patients,
because he knows that they are less likely to respond to this campaign, and have less access
to surgery. And he wonders whether these strategies might prove to be of most benefit to
those who are already receptive to health messages, who already think about their health,
and who already have reasonable access to healthcare.
Jim then thinks about how health fits into the lives of his patients. He has been reading
lately about ‘healthism’ [45], the accusation that public health prioritises health outcomes
over other outcomes regardless of the goals of the individuals and populations they serve.
People clearly value their ‘health’, he thinks, but what does this mean? ‘Health’ and ‘public
health’ can be defined very narrowly or very broadly [44, 46, 47]. Jim can see that these
strategies serve narrow definitions of health as physical health, but he wonders whether
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they are good for people’s health more broadly: for their wellbeing. In his consultations
with a patient like Megan, he can carefully explore life goals, values, what her weight means
and how this relates to her emotional wellbeing, fulfilment and happiness. This is difficult,
and time consuming, but it can be done. However Jim knows that weight is not simply an
individual matter [48]. If we’re going to intervene in weight in communities, how can we
think about the relationship between community and individual goals and freedoms?
We suggest that the best way of thinking about the ethics of intervening in individuals’
weight and communities’ or populations’ weight is to think about both at once, and to
consider the relationship between them. This is surprisingly rare, perhaps because few
individuals work across the clinical–population health boundary. However, as is clear from
the summit recommendations to support both an extensive social marketing campaign
and the medical and surgical management of obesity, it is readily apparent that individuals
and communities mutually interact.
This suggests that it is a mistake to understand issues like obesity, and the public health
responses to them, as simply a contest between respect for individual liberty (or autonomy)
and our responsibilities as citizens, and that there is merit in exploring some of the various
‘third way’ positions between individualism and collectivism that have been suggested in
public health ethics [6, 7, 14, 17, 21, 27, 36, 49–52]. This work suggests several answers
for Jim’s concerns that might help public health strategies to be more ethically justifiable.
Respect for individual autonomy is, largely, a concern with freedom – with the freedom to
be and to do as one wishes. However, as relational approaches to autonomy have shown us,
these freedoms are not a purely individual matter: they are constituted in relationships. The
communities that we belong to produce goods: things that we value. It been proposed that
these goods are of two kinds: aggregative and corporate [52]. Aggregative goods are simply
the aggregation of individual goods. Corporate goods, however, are an ‘emergent social
property’ of communities: they can only be obtained through community collaboration
or cooperation [52]. Corporate goods of public health interventions might include, for
example, the creation of conditions that support sustainable future improvements in health,
the development of new shared and valued cultural practices, or community attributes
like solidarity or diversity. Corporate goods have a future orientation – rather than simply
providing a present benefit, they provide a benefit available to future communities. This
distinction resonates with Munthe’s call for public health interventions that both 1)
promote population health, and 2) promote ‘equal (and real) opportunities for everyone
to be more healthy’ [50]. For Munthe, this required providing the freedom to be healthy
or unhealthy (including by preventing others from constraining our health opportunities),
but the means only to be healthy [50].
To take such a ‘third way’ position on intervention in weight would assist decision-making
for both individual and population-level interventions. It provides an ethical rationale that
resonates with Rose’s concern for intervention in ‘root causes’. Changing the price structure
and composition of the food sold in supermarkets, providing usable public transport, or
designing a local community to provide healthier food outlets and better opportunities
for walking would be recognisable interventions in root causes – of health, not just of
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weight. Critically, they are also corporate goods – the kind that can only be achieved
through collective effort and which provide sustainable future benefit. They provide
opportunities for health and prevent others – like food producers – from constraining
our health opportunities; however they do not constrain individuals’ freedoms to live
unhealthily if that is what they desire. Mulvaney-Day has shown, on the basis of social
network analyses, that the people one cares about – that is, one’s affective network – may be
a more important influence on weight than the people who live nearby [53]. They suggest
that ethical interventions engage at a meso-level – the level of community – leveraging
existing relationship networks to change the opportunities available to people. This may,
at least in part, explain the popularity of programs such as School Kitchen Gardens [54]
which provide opportunities for existing affective networks to make changes together. Such
programs also potentially provide both opportunities and corporate goods by changing
the norms and practices in a social group, allowing those to be handed down through
generations.
The solutions chosen by the summit provide none of these collective community-level
goods. Instead, the summit used a collective process to support individualistic solutions,
with little evidence of engagement with the important ethical issues raised for clinical or
public health practice. This does not, of course, suggest that participants were ignorant of,
or insensitive to, many of the ethical issues that underpin medicine and public health, but
rather, that these issues were not explicitly addressed, that the limitations of ‘evidence’ were
not made clear, that the complex relationships between individuals and the communities
in which they live were not fully exposed and that the socio-moral goals of healthcare were
not made explicit. These are important failings, because the values, focus, scope and goals of
clinical medicine and public health are both distinct and overlapping; because interventions
to address problems affecting individuals and communities may have different goals, risks
and benefits, and because moral compromise in the design and delivery of healthcare is
always necessary. For both clinicians and public health decision-makers, the central task
is to think through the ethical and philosophical basis for actions before they are taken.
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